Articles Posted in Delay in Paying Claim

Most Saginaw insurance lawyers have had a client to call and complain about an insurance company to delay in paying a claim. This is often a violation of the Prompt Payment of Claims Act. The U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division issued an opinion in August of 2015, that in part, explains how that Act applies. The opinion is styled, Mainali Corporation v. Covington Specialty Insurance Company, et al. This is a case that was filed in State Court and removed to Federal Court by Covington based on diversity jurisdiction. Mainali was attempting to have the case remanded to the State Court.

This lawsuit arises in connection with a fire that damaged Mainali’s property, a Chevron station and convenience store. According to Mainali’s original petition, Covington insured the Property under a policy that covered fire damage and business interruption losses; Covington assigned Engle Martin and Associates, Inc. as the adjustment company to oversee the claims adjustment process; and Engle Martin assigned Summers as the individual field adjuster. Mainali alleges that Summers failed to conduct a reasonable investigation, denied coverage for damage to the Property and business losses, and underestimated the damage; after underestimating the damage, Summers and Engle Martin reduced the amount payable to Mainali under the Policy; relying on Summers’ inadequate investigation and conclusions regarding the damage, Covington agreed to pay only a portion of the amount due on the claim; and because of Covington’s refusal to pay for repairs and business losses, Mainali was unable to reopen the Chevron station and convenience store, causing Mainali to suffer additional damage in the form of lost business income. Mainali also alleges that Covington, Engle Martin, and Summers failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of Mainali’s claim, thereby violating Texas Insurance Code, Section 541.060(a)(1); failed to attempt to settle the claim in a fair manner, even though they were aware of their liability under the Policy, thereby violating Section 541.060(a)(2)(A); failed to provide prompt and reasonable explanation for the denial of the claim, thereby violating Section 541.060(a)(3); refused to pay the claim without conducting a reasonable investigation of the claim, thereby violating Section 541.060(a)(7); misrepresented the Policy to Mainali by making an untrue statement of material fact, thereby violating Section 541.061(1); misrepresented the Policy to Mainali by failing to state a material fact necessary to make other statements not misleading, thereby violating Section 541.061(2); misrepresented the Policy to Mainali by making a statement that would mislead a reasonably prudent person to a false conclusion of material fact, thereby violating Section 541.061(3); failed to acknowledge receipt of the claim, thereby violating Section 542.055(a)(1); failed to timely commence an investigation of the claim thereby violating Section 542.055(a)(2)-(3); failed to notify Mainali in writing of the acceptance or rejection of the claim not later than the 15th business day after receipt of all items, statements, and forms, thereby violating Section 542.056(a); delayed payment of the claim, thereby violating Section 542.058(a). Plus other causes of action.

As it relates to the last four allegation, violations of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, the Court stated, “Summers cannot be held liable under any section of Chapter 542. Chapter 542 only applies to specifically listed “insurers,” and Summers, an adjuster, is not an insurer.”

Mansfield insurance lawyers need to read the Houston Court of Appeals [14th Dist.] opinion styled, Daugherty v. American Motorists Insurance Company. It was issued in 1998.

Daugherty filed suit against American for refusing to pay his claim. The trial court ruled in favor of American. Daugherty appealed.

The record reflects that Daugherty purchased a BMW on January 12, 1994.   The sales price of the vehicle was $58,148.88. With the addition of taxes and fees, Daugherty paid a total of $64,678.97 for the automobile. The car was stolen on February 15, 1994. Daugherty promptly reported the theft to American. On February 25, 1994, Daugherty submitted an affidavit of vehicle theft to American in which he claimed a loss of $68,895.42.

Arlington insurance lawyers should read the 1999, Tyler Court of Appeals case styled, Dunn v. Southern Farm Bureau. The opinion discusses an insurance company’e responsibilities under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims statutes.

Dunn was insured under a standard form automobile liability policy issued by Farm Bureau which contained uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage. She was injured when her vehicle was struck from the rear by an underinsured motorist. In her suit Dunn sought to recover not only UM benefits, but additional damages and attorney fees as the result of Farm Bureau’s alleged violation of the prompt payment requirements of the Texas Insurance Code. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dunn in the amount of $220,000.00 for personal injury damages and $118,251.22 for prejudgment interest. However, the trial court did not award Dunn the requested 18 percent additional damages and attorney fees provided for in the Prompt Pay Statute. In her sole issue presented, Dunn asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to award the 18 percent penalty, attorney’s fees, and prejudgment interest.

At the heart of this case is the interpretation and application of the prompt payment provisions. The relevant provisions of the statute state:

Saginaw insurance lawyers need to be able to discuss with their clients the duties the clients have to the insurance company regarding the Prompt Payment of Claims Act.

It boils down to this, a claimant has two duties to the insurance company.

(1) to give the insurer notice of the claim; and (2) to give the insurance company all the items the insurance company reasonable needs to secure proof of final loss.

Everman insurance attorneys need to know the insurance laws regarding payment of claims the same as any other insurance lawyer. Here is one nuance to the Prompt Pay Statutes that a lot of attorneys are not familiar with. It regards prompt pay and third-party claims.

In looking at the Prompt Pay Statute, on its face, the statute applies only to “first-party” claims. The statute defines “claim” to mean a “first-party claim that: (A) is made by an insured or a policyholder under an insurance policy or contract or by a beneficiary named in the policy or contract; and (B) must be paid by the insurer directly to the insured or beneficiary.” That is the clear language in Section 542.051. This would exclude liability insurance claims for coverage that must be paid to an injured third party.

In spite of the reading of this statute, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in a 1996, opinion that the statute does apply to third-party liability insurance. The style of the opinion is, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Gandy. The court was discussing the liability insurer’s ability to seek a declaratory judgement when issues of coverage and the duty to defend arise. The court stated that if the insured were successful, the insured should be entitled to recover attorney’s fees and penalties under the statute.

Insurance lawyers in Kennedale need to know these basics regarding insurance claims and claimants when looking at the Prompt Payment of Claims Statutes.

The Texas statutes regarding Prompt Pay are found in the Texas Insurance Code. It is there we find that the protections of the insurance statutes apply to a “claimant” who is defined as “a person making a claim.” This is found specifically in Section 542.051(3).

The statute provides:

Dallas insurance attorneys know the statutes dealing with the requirements of time within which an insurance company must pay a claim. A 2000, Corpus Christi Court of Appeals case addresses this issue. The style of the case is, Colonial County Mutual Insurance Company v. Hector Valdez.

Hector Valdez bought a 1992 Plymouth Acclaim and arranged insurance for the car with Colonial through the Diego Luna Insurance Agency. An employee of the insurance agency told Hector that the car was insured “against theft, against accidents, against medical expenses, everything concerning the insurance.” A few months after obtaining this insurance, Hector sold the car to his son, Rene Valdez, for $7,000. Rene obtained a loan from Mercantile Bank in order to make the purchase. Hector called the Diego Luna Insurance Agency and told them Mercantile Bank would be calling them to make “changes” and “arrangements” on the insurance. Diego Luna testified that an employee of Mercantile Bank did call, and asked to verify insurance on the car for “a Mr. Valdez.” The bank was told that “Mr. Valdez” had insurance. Hector continued to pay insurance premiums on the car while Rene owned it. It is undisputed that Hector never told Colonial or Diego Luna Insurance Agency that he had sold the car to Rene. It is also undisputed that Hector was never informed, orally or in writing, that he could only insure the car if he owned it.

In November 1995 Hector’s policy was automatically renewed. On January 14, 1996 the car was stolen. Hector reported the theft and Colonial proceeded to investigate. During this investigation, Colonial discovered that Rene was the owner of the car. On March 19, 1996 Colonial sent Hector a letter informing him that “the handling of this claim is being conducted under a Reservation of Rights” because Colonial was investigating whether Hector had an “insurable interest” in the car.

Fort Worth insurance lawyers handling hail damage claims as well as any other insurance claims need to read this 2004, Texas Supreme Court opinion. It is styled, Republic Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc.

This is a first part claim. Following a hail storm Mex-Tex, Inc. notified its property insurer, Republic, of damage to the roof of Signature Mall, a retail shopping center that Mex-Tex owned. Mex-Tex claimed that the roof had been destroyed and should be replaced. Republic immediately investigated the claim but disputed the amount of damage attributable to hail. The roof had leaked for a long time, and months before the storm Mex-Tex had obtained estimates to replace it. While Republic was still investigating the claim, it learned that Mex-Tex had retained a contractor to go ahead, without waiting on Republic, and replace the roof at a cost of $179,000 with one of the same kind, but which would be fixed to the building mechanically rather than by ballast (that is, rocks) as the old roof had been. Republic’s first response was to offer what it believed was the cost to repair the minimal hail damage, $22,000, as what it termed “partial payment” of Mex-Tex’s claim, but when Mex-Tex rejected that offer, Republic sent Mex-Tex a check on August 20, 1999, including $145,460, an amount representing what Republic’s engineer had determined was the cost of replacing the mall’s roof with an identical one, attached by ballast.

Mex-Tex returned the check. Republic re-sent it. Mex-Tex re-returned it. Republic then replied that it would hold the money until Mex-Tex accepted it, which Mex-Tex did on October 12, 2000, as partial payment of its claim. Meanwhile, Mex-Tex had sued Republic for breach of the policy and delay penalties under the Prompt Pay Statute.  After trial the court found that Republic’s failure to pay Mex-Tex the $179,000 was a breach of Republic’s policy obligation to replace the roof with one of “like kind and quality”-despite the fact that Mex-Tex’s cost exceeded the replacement cost of an identical roof by $33,540-and awarded Mex-Tex that difference in damages. The court also awarded Mex-Tex 18% per annum on $179,000 from November 4, 1999, the date the court determined that Republic should have tendered that amount, which was 75 days after it tendered $145,460, to the date Mex-Tex accepted that partial payment almost a year later, and thereafter on the $33,540 difference until judgment.  

Life insurance attorneys in Dallas will run across situations where there are competing claims for policy benefits. Sometimes those claims are legitimate concerns and sometimes not. A 2014, opinion from the US Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit needs to be read. The style of the case is, State Farm Life Insurance Company v. Troy Jonas, et al. Here is relevant information from that case.

Troy Jonas and his wife Jennifer purchased reciprocal policies of life insurance: she owned the policy on her life, with him as beneficiary; he owned the policy on his life, with her as beneficiary. When they divorced in 2011, the court reassigned the policies’   ownership: after the divorce, Troy owned the policy on Jennifer’s life.  Each policy provided that “a change of Owner or Successor Owner does not change the Beneficiary Desig-nation.”  Troy therefore thought it unnecessary to redesignate himself as the beneficiary of the policy insuring Jennifer’s life.  

Jennifer died on August 30, 2012. Troy promptly submitted a claim for the proceeds.   State Farm did not pay.  It expressed concern that the proceeds might belong to the couple’s children who had been named as secondary beneficiaries or to Jennifer’s estate as a result of Texas Family Code, Section 9.301, which provides that if a divorce occurs after one spouse has designated the other spouse as a beneficiary of an insurance policy, the designation lapses with some exceptions and, unless a new designation is made, the proceeds belong to any alternative beneficiary or the decedent’s estate.  Jennifer was domiciled in Texas when she died, and the policy had been issued there; the parties agreed that Texas law applied to this litigation. Troy replied that this provision did not apply when the divorce decree reassigns the policy’s ownership to the named beneficiary.  

Lake Worth insurance lawyers handling Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage may find this Texas Supreme Court case interesting. The opinion was issued in 2001, and the style of the case is, Allstate Insurance Company v. Bonner. Here is some of the relevant information from the case.

Rhonda Bonner was covered by an auto insurance policy issued by Allstate. Bonner was injured in an accident caused by an uninsured motorist. This policy included a non-duplication-of-benefits provision. Bonner reported a claim for medical costs resulting from her injury to Allstate, and received $1,619 in personal injury protection benefits. After receiving this, Bonner filed an uninsured motorist claim, which Allstate received on December 15, 1997. Allstate did not acknowledge receipt of the claim until, January 16, 1998, and eventually rejected the claim.

Bonner filed suit against Allstate seeking payment of uninsured motorist benefits. Bonner also sought attorneys’ fees and costs, relying to the Prompt Payment of Claims statute, which requires insurance companies to acknowledge receipt of claims within 15 days. The jury awarded compensatory damages to Bonner of $1,000 and fees and costs totaling $7,500. The trial judge however, rendered a take-nothing judgment after trial. The court of appeals upheld the take-nothing judgment with respect to compensatory damages, as Bonner had already been compensated under the personal injury benefit, but assessed costs and fees against Allstate. The court of appeals held that an insurance company must comply with the Prompt Payment of Claims Act every time the insured presents a claim. Allstate sought review from the Supreme Court of Texas, asserting that Bonner did not present a claim for which it was liable (because of the no-nduplication of benefits provision). Allstate distinguished this case from earlier cases in which insureds had valid claims above and beyond what they had already been paid by Allstate.

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