Articles Posted in Life Insurance

Weatherford life insurance lawyers know that the “Slayer Statute” works the same in Federal Court as in State Court. A 1986, opinion from the Northern District of Texas says so. The style of the case is, American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Huckleberry.

This case is before the court on the motion for summary judgment of defendant Deborah Huckleberry Stevens (“Stevens” or “the guardian”). Upon review of the motion, response, affidavits, exhibits, and brief, it is apparent that no issues of fact exist for trial. Consequently, for the reasons stated below, Stevens’ motion is granted.

American interpled the $100,000 face amount of its policy insuring the life of Beverly Ann Huckleberry, deceased.

Arlington life insurance lawyers need to know how self-defense works in the Slayer Statute. The Slayer Statute is found today in the Texas Insurance Code, Section 1103.151. A case discussing self-defense is a Fort Worth Court of Appeals opinion styled, Crawford v. Coleman.

Cornelius Shoaf appeals a judgment denying him insurance proceeds because a jury found he willfully caused the death of his wife, Sandra, the insured.

Four life insurance policies were in force at the time of Sandra’s death. The policies named Cornelius primary beneficiary. The insurance companies filed an interpleader naming the parties to this suit and paid the insurance proceeds into the registry of the court. Upon the trial of the cause, the jury found Cornelius had willfully caused the death of Sandra. The trial court then found that Cornelius had forfeited his right to receive the insurance proceeds under TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1981) which states:

Parker County life insurance lawyers need to read and understand this 1992, Houston Court of Appeals [14th Dist.] opinion. It is styled, Francis v. Marshall.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee, Doris E. Marshall. She brought suit to recover as a beneficiary under a life insurance policy and the trial court held that she was the proper recipient of the proceeds. This Court affirmed.

Appellant, Douglas C. Francis, was found guilty of the murder of his wife, Karen E. Francis. Mrs. Francis had been insured under a $50,000 life insurance policy. Appellant was the primary beneficiary under this contract, and the deceased’s mother and appellee, Doris E. Marshall, was the contingent beneficiary. Upon appeal, appellant’s murder conviction was affirmed and he is now serving a life sentence.

Life insurance lawyers in Texas know what the “Slayer Statute” says. It has been in use for many years. A 1973, Eastland Court of Appeals case talks about this statute. The case is styled, Cooley v. Cooley.

Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York brought an interpleader action to determine the proper beneficiary under a policy of life insurance issued on the life of Melvin K. Cooley. The defendants were Mrs. Doris Cooley, the named beneficiary, Mary Helen Cooley as guardian of the estates of three minors. Mary Helen Cooley contended that Doris Cooley should be disqualified as a beneficiary on the grounds that Doris Cooley willfully brought about the death of the insured, Melvin K. Cooley, being convicted and sentenced for same in the country of Iran. On the jury’s finding that Mrs. Doris Cooley did not willfully bring about the death of Melvin K. Cooley, the trial court entered judgment for Doris Cooley. Mary Helen Cooley appeals.

It was established on the trial of the cause that Mary Helen Cooley married Melvin Cooley in 1956. He was the father of her three children for whom she was duly qualified as guardian. This marriage terminated in 1962 by divorce.

Life insurance attorneys in Dallas can tell you about Section 1103.151 of the Texas Insurance Code. It is often times called the “Slayer Statute.” Here is a 1969, Fort Worth Court of Appeals opinion that dealt with the Slayer Statute when it was Article 21.23 of the Insurance Code.

This suit involves ascertainment of the rightful claimant to the proceeds of a life insurance policy issued by National Life and Accident Insurance Company. The latter, as stakeholder, filed the suit and deposited $8,009.11 into the registry of the court for disposition by it to the claimants entitled thereto.

Vergia L. Giles, insured, was shot by his wife, Evelyn Jean Wiggins, nee Evelyn Jean Giles, appellee and primary beneficiary of the policy, on September 4, 1966. He died as result thereof on September 14, 1966.

Benbrook insurance lawyers at some point will have to deal with the Slayer Statute which is found in the Texas Insurance Code, Section 1103.151. In 1900, the Slayer Statute did not exist in Texas. A Texas opinion from that time illustrates how it works today. A person has to prove the beneficiary caused the death of the insured in order to be able to prevent the beneficiary from receiving policy benefits. The case is styled, Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Kentucky v. Mellott.

Mutual denied policy benefits based on the allegations that the beneficiary (Mrs. Mellott) caused the death of the insured (William Mellott) by administering to him strychnine poison for the purpose of causing his death.

Briefly stated, the facts proven on the trial are as follows: The policy on the life of William Mellott was issued on the 15th day of March, 1898, and said Mellott died on June 13, 1898. The evidence is conflicting as to whether Mr. or Mrs. Mellott procured the issuance of the policy, but the premium on the policy was paid by Mrs. Mellott. About the same time this policy was issued Mrs. Mellott procured the issuance of a policy for $10,000 by the same company on the life of Lucinda Jeffers, and had said policy assigned to her by Mrs. Jeffers. The evidence is conflicting as to whether or not Mrs. Jeffers knew that a policy had been issued on her life, and that she had transferred same to Mrs. Mellott; she testifying that Mrs. Mellott told her shortly after she had signed the paper, which she understood only gave Mrs. Mellott the right to use the policy, that she failed to pass a satisfactory examination, and that the policy had not been issued, in which statement she was corroborated by the testimony of two other witnesses. Mrs. Jeffers about this time made a will bequeathing all of her property, including the policy in question, to Mrs. Mellott. The deceased, William Mellott, for more than a year previous to his death, had been in bad health, suffering from trouble with his stomach and bowels, which trouble had at times caused him to have convulsions. About a month before his death he was seriously ill with entero coletis, the same character of disease which his attending physician testified was the cause of his death. On the 6th day of June, 1898, he was taken suddenly ill, and Dr. McKay was sent for; he being the nearest physician, and the emergency not allowing his regular physician to be sent for. He was first attacked with spasms or convulsions. Dr. McKay attended him regularly from the 6th to the 13th of June, making several visits each day. This physician testified that the deceased had convulsions from the first day that he was called to see him, and that such convulsions were among the usual symptoms, or rather results, of the disease from which the patient was suffering. His last visit to deceased before his death was about 8 o’clock on the evening before his death. At this time he thought the deceased was better, and did not anticipate a fatal termination of the disease. The deceased began to grow worse shortly after Dr. McKay left, on the evening of the 12th, and died about 4 or 5 o’clock the next morning. The doctor was sent for about 11 o’clock that night, but was not at home, and was again sent for about 3 o’clock. In answer to this last call he went to Mellott’s house, but arrived there just after his death. The preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that the convulsions from which deceased began to suffer shortly after Dr. McKay left him, on the evening of the 12th, were of the same general character as those which deceased had previously had, but were more severe, and continued to increase in frequency and severity until they produced death. One witness, however, a Mr. Sonnen, testified that he was with the deceased from about 8 until about 12 o’clock that night, and that the convulsions were of a different character from those which deceased had previously had. He described the kind of convulsions, and the position which the body of the deceased assumed during the convulsions, and Drs. Red and Knox testified as medical experts that convulsions of the character described by this witness were, in their opinion, produced by strychnine poison. The body of the deceased was exhumed about six months after his death, and a chemical analysis of the stomach failed to show any trace of strychnine.

A 1955, Beaumont Court of Appeals case discusses a life insurance issue that comes up every once in a while. The case is styled, Pritchett v. Henry.

Here is the relevant information from the case.

Howard Pritchett and his wife, Clyda Pritchett, the appellants, filed their suit against the appellee, Percy B. Henry, and certain life insurance companies; they alleged that they are the parents of Melba Henry, who had been the wife of appellee Percy B. Henry; that on or about January 8, 1955 Percy B. Henry shot and killed his wife, Melba Henry, unlawfully and illegally killing and murdering her. They further alleged that at the time of the alleged willful killing of Melba Henry by her husband, Percy B. Henry, there were in existence several policies of life insurance insuring the life of Melba Henry and the said Percy B. Henry was the beneficiary in said life insurance policies. They further alleged that they were the next of kin of the deceased, Melba Henry, after the appellee Percy B. Henry, and prayed the court to forfeit the interests of the appellee Henry in all policies of life insurance by virtue of Article 21.23 of the Insurance Code of Texas, V.A.T.S. This Article is now found in the Texas Insurance Code, Section 1103.151.

Weatherford life insurance attorneys need to know what an insurance company will do when they are unsure who is entitled to life insurance benefits. The answer is that they will file an “interpleader” and notify all people who might have a claim. This was the procedure followed in a 1957 case from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals. The style of the case is Murray v. American National Insurance Company.

American issued a policy on the life of Otis Carl Murray in which his wife, Sarah Lou Murray, was named beneficiary. Otis died on July 24, 1955. Sarah was indicted by the grand jury of Runnels County on August 24, 1955, for the death of her husband.

Sarah, on September 1, 1955, made demand on American for payment of the proceeds of the policy. Proof of death submitted did not reveal the cause of death of the insured. Less than thirty days after demand for payment, American advised Sarah’s attorney it was prepared to pay the amount due under the policy, subject to a valid and satisfactory release of liability, but called attention to the fact it had been put on notice that Sarah was under indictment for the death of her husband, and that if suit were filed American would pay the money into court and resist payment of costs, penalties and attorney’s fees on the ground it had not denied liability. Through the month of September American corresponded with Sarah’s attorney requesting completion of proofs of death.

Fort Worth life insurance lawyers will see situations where a life insurance company admits it owes money under a life insurance policy but is unable to determine who is owed the money. The proper action is for the life insurance company to interplead the money into a court. A 1957, Fort Worth Court of Appeals describes this situation. The style of the case is, Sarah Lou Murray v. American National Insurance Company.

Appellee American National Insurance Company issued a policy on the life of Otis Carl Murray in which his wife, appellant Sarah Lou Murray, was named beneficiary. The insured died on July 24, 1955. Appellant was indicted by the grand jury of Runnels County on August 24, 1955, for the death of her husband.

Appellant, on September 1, 1955, made demand on appellee for payment of the proceeds of the policy. Proof of death submitted did not reveal the cause of death of the insured. Less than thirty days after demand for payment, appellee advised appellant’s attorney it was prepared to pay the amount due under the policy, subject to a valid and satisfactory release of liability, but called attention to the fact it had been put on notice that appellant was under indictment for the death of her husband, and that if suit were filed appellee would pay the money into court and resist payment of costs, penalties and attorney’s fees on the ground it had not denied liability. Through the month of September the appellee corresponded with appellant’s attorney requesting completion of proofs of death.